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method of procedure for interrupting or suspending the running

of prescription against the lien." 26 The court's fear that a contrary interpretation would permit perpetual encumbrance could
be avoided by construing the singular term "reinscription" to
allow only one reinscription of the privilege. 27 Since judicial

proceedings do not preserve the privilege, however, such restricted interpretation could create other' serious problems; litigation could easily extend beyond the term of one reinscrip-

tion. 28 In any event, this decision requires the materialman to
file suit on his timely recorded claim within one year of recorda29
tion regardless of reinscription.

Reid K. Hebert

TORTS -

IMPUTATION OF SON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
TO MOTHER

Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile driven by her minor

son with his father's permission, was injured when her son
negligently attempted a left turn and was struck by defendant
who was negligently attempting to pass him. The district court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff in her suit for personal
injury, but it was reversed in part by the court of appeal. On
certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court reinstated the district
court's judgment. Held, in absence of an agency or other legal
relationship for which responsibility is imposed on one for the
fault of another, contributory negligence cannot be imputed to
26. Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 825, 197 So.
566, 569 (1940). It should be noted that the use of the terms "interruption" and
"suspension" as effects of the reinscription is not entirely correct, but the scope
of this Note is not intended to include an analytical criticism of such a use.
27. DAGGETT, LoUIsIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES 322 (1942).
28. If only one reinscription were allowed and the court interpreted the stat*ute to permit that reinscription to preserve both the right of action and the privilege, when suit was filed after the first but within the second year, the defendant
owner could effectively use delays which would cause the judicial proceedings to
go beyond the second year-and the plaintiff materialman would lose his privilege. The court effectively avoided this situation by requiring suit to be filed
within the first year and impliedly allowing an unlimited number of reinscriptions in the event judicial proceedings extend beyond the next year.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in the instant case in Arby Brothers, Inc. v. Tillman, 162 So. 2d 346 (La. 1964). Justice Hamiter, who dissented
in the Crochet case, speaking for the majority, said: "The author of this opinion
disagreea with that conclusion [of the Crochet case] and still entertains the same
view. However, since the result reached in such a case does bear on the merchantability of titles to immovables he now feels compelled to abide by the conclusion
'until it is changed by legislative action."
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bar recovery against a negligent third party. Presence of the
mother in the automobile is not sufficient to establish the
theoretical right of control essential to an agency relationship.
Gaspardv. LeMaire, 158 So. 2d 149 (La. 1963).1
The large number of traffic accidents and the frequent oc-

currence of accidents involving insolvent drivers have led courts
to seek means of placing the solvency of another, usually the
car owner, behind the wrongdoing of the driver.2 This vicarious
responsibility of a third party generally has been achieved by
positing an agency relationship between the driver and another
person either under ordinary agency principles or under the
theories of joint enterprise, the common law family purpose
doctrine, and the civil law community errand doctrine.8 The
joint enterprise doctrine requires a mutual right of control
by passenger and driver and a common purpose with mutual
benefit to passenger and driver. 4 Under this doctrine both passenger and driver are considered agents of each other.5 Under
the common law family purpose doctrine, the wife driving the
1. The court's very significant holding with respect to damages is not discussed in this Note. It is hoped that its ramifications will be fully explored
in a subsequent issue of the Review.
2. PROSSER, TORTS 368 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Ibid. For emphasis on the agency relationship see Rodriguez v. State Farm

Mutual Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 432 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) ; Weitkam v. Johnston,
5

So. 2d

582

(La.

App.

Orl.

Cir. 1942) ;

Waguespack

v.

Savarese,

13

So.

2d 726 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1943) ; Smith v. Howard Crumley & Co., 171 So.
188 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
Of course, an owner himself would be guilty of independent negligence
if he allowed an incompetent person to drive his car or allowed such a person
to remain in control when it became obvious that his incompetency could
result in an accident. When such negligence by an owner plays a causal part
in an accident, that person should be barred from recovery by his own contributory negligence. See PROSSER, TORTS 300 (2d ed. 1955) ; Lessler, The Proposed Discard of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FORDHAmr L. REV. 175
(1951).
4. Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 CORNELL
L.Q. 325 (1931) ; RESTATE-MENT (SECOND) TORTS § 491, comment c (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1963). The American Law Institute adds the further requirement that
the interest held in common be of a pecuniary nature. Comment 38 YALE- L.J. 810,
(1929). The chief use of joint enterprise has been to bar recovery against a
negligent third party. It is seldom used to allow recovery by a third party
against an innocent member of a joint enterprise. The joint enterprise doctrine.
should never be used to bar recovery by a passenger against a negligent driverwhen they are members of a joint enterprise, as has been done in a few misguided cases.
5. Joint enterprise has not been too clearly defined by the Louisiana courts.
In the case of Buquet v. St. Amant, 55 So. 2d 645 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951), the.
court discussed the case in terms of joint enterprise whereas the case should
have been determined on an agency basis. Note, 12 LA. L. REV. 323 (1952).
An agency relationship is based on the passenger's right of control overthe driver; joint enterprise requires mutual right of control by all parties.
engaged in the enterprise. Riggs v. Strauss, 2 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir1941); RESTATEMIENT

(SECOND),

TORTS § 491

(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
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car is considered the agent of the husband, and he will be
vicariously liable for her negligence.6 The civil law community
errand doctrine, which is similar to the family purpose doctrine, considers the wife the agent of the community and holds
the husband liable as head of the community. 7 In addition to
these special relationships, Louisiana courts generally have held
that an agency relationship exists between a third person and
the driver if the third person has a theoretical right of control
over the driver, and the ride is for the benefit of the third
person or the driver and the third person." When such an agency
relationship is found, the courts will hold the third person liable
for the primary negligence of the driver. 9
The courts have not restricted agency doctrines to cases
involving primary negligence of the driver, but have expanded them to cover situations in which the driver is contributorily negligent. Thus when the third party is a passenger
in a car driven by his "agent" and is injured by the combined
negligence of his agent and another party, he will be precluded
from recovery against the other party. This practice of allowing imputation of contributory negligence whenever primary
negligence may be imputed-known as the "both ways test"has been consistently criticized by legal scholars. 10
There is language in the instant case which would support
a contention that the court has rejected the agency devices
based on theoretical right to control as a ground for imputation
of negligence. When this language is read in context with the
remainder of the opinion, however, it seems that the court
6. Comment, 7 LA. L. REV. 558 (1947).
7. Note, 35 TuL. L. REv. 828 (1961).
8. Rodriguez v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 432 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1956) ; Waguespack v. Savarese, 13 So. 2d 726 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) ;
Riggs v. Strauss, 2 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941). In the Riggs case the
owner-passenger was asleep at the time of the accident. In imputing the driver's
contributory negligence to the owner, the court stated that theoretical right of
control existed and the fact it was not being exercised at that particular time
was irrelevant.

9. Rodriguez v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 432 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1956). In this case plaintiff was allowed to recover against her own insurance company, since her policy contained an omnibus clause, insuring anyone

driving plaintiff's car with her consent, but she was precluded from recovery
against the driver of the other car by her driver-agent's negligence. This case
also illustrates the principle that, even though a person is barred from recovery against a third party by his agent's negligence, he may still sue his agent

for damages.
10. Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an
Action for Loss of Services, 2 U. Cni. L. REv. 173, 177 (1935) ; Gregory,
Vicarious Liability and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831 (1932)

2 HARPMa & JAmEs, TORaS 1273 (1956).
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has not rejected this agency device but has instead attacked
the finding of a theoretical right of control based on the presence of the alleged principal in the automobile. The court emphatically stated that "it is unrealistic to hold, in the present
day use of motor vehicles when heavy traffic is the rule and
not the exception, that the occupant of a motor vehicle has
factually any control or right of control over the driving of
the operator." The import appears to be that, although contributory negligence may be imputed through an agency relationship, the finding of a theoretical right of control must be
based on circumstances other than the presence of the alleged
principal in the automobile. In other words, the presence or
absence of the alleged principal in the automobile is immaterial
to the determination of whether he had a theoretical right of
control over the negligent driver.
When this principle is applied in the instant case, it is
clear that contributory negligence should not have been imputed to the mother. Had she not been present in the automobile at the time of the accident, she would not have been
liable for her son's primary negligence." The only basis for
imputing his contributory negligence was that the mother's
presence gave rise to her theoretical right of control over her
son which, when coupled with the obvious benefit of the trip to
her, created an agency relationship. The Supreme Court refused to find that there was any theoretical right of control
in this situation. 12 The court's position may also be illustrated
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2318 (1870) makes the father, or after his death
the mother, responsible for the torts of the unemancipated child. This article
has been interpreted to mean that neither the primary nor the contributory
negligence of the child can be imputed to the mother while the father is living.
Central National Insurance Co. v. Vagas, 144 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) ; Grantham v. Smith, 132 So. 805 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931). For a
discussion of liability for damages caused by infants, see Note, 24 LA. L. REV.
656 (1964).
12. Appellate court decisions do not clearly disclose the factors used to
determine whether or not a person has the "right of control" necessary to establish an agency relationship. In the interesting case of Geyen v. Toussard,
148 So. 2d 115 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), the court allowed recovery against
a negligent third party by an owner-passenger, despite the contributory negligence of the driver, who was the owner's major son and who was driving with
the owner's permission. The language of the court, however, would never lead
to an expectation of recovery by the plaintiff. The court said that the owner
would not be liable unless he is present or the driver is his agent. This statement, repeated in other decisions, would lead to the conclusion that the owner's
presence alone is sufficient for imputing the driver's negligence to him. While
the owner's presence alone has never been considered prima facie proof of right
of control in Louisiana, a number of other jurisdictions presuppose a right of
control based on the mere presence of the owner. Lessler, The Proposed Discard
of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 156
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by its disapproval of the court of appeal decisions cited in the
instant case. 13 Owner-passengers or, in one case, a borrowerpassenger were denied recovery because their presence gave
them a theoretical right of control which, in addition to mutual
benefit, established an agency relationship through which con14
tributory negligence could be imputed.
This rejection of the presence or absence of the principal
as a factor in determining the existence of a theoretical right
of control is a sound step toward bringing the fictitious agency
doctrines used to impute negligence more in line with reality. 15
Courts should be extremely careful when applying agency doctrines developed from master-servant and other business relations to ordinary social ventures. Joint enterprise and other
agency relationships, when used to impute contributory negligence, are expanding the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence when the general trend is to restrict its use.' 6 Moreover,
the imputation of contributory negligence thwarts the original
purpose of doctrines imputing primary negligence since a rule
which was designed to create liability is used to destroy it." It
is hoped that the decision in the instant case will be the beginning of a trend away from the imputation of contributory negligence, and that the court will eventually reject the "both ways"
(1951).
13. Lawrason v. Richard, 172 La. 696, 135 So. 29 (1931); Rodriguez v.
State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 432 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) ; Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Allen, 36 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) ;
Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FORDunu
L. REV. 165 (1951).
Right of control has also -been used as a justification for vicarious liability.
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1366 (1956).
. 14. In Wolfe v. Toye, 138 So. 453 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931), the mother
who owned the car asked her son to drive her to the railroad station to meet
her parents. His negligence in an accident was imputed to her because the
court found an agency relationship. However, the son had picked up his grandparents on previous occasions in his mother's car when she did not accompany
him, and the court suggested that, had the accident occurred on one of these
occasions, the agency relationship would not have existed, since the mother
would not have had right of control.
.15. See Lessler, The Proposed Discard of Imputed Contributory Negligence,
20 FORDHAm L. REV. 172 (1951). -See also PROSSER, TORTS 300 (2d ed. 1955) :
"So far as imputed contributory negligence is still applied, it may he regarded
-as an historical survival of a rule which once had some reason for its existence,
where. that reason is gone."
With the advent of omnibus clauses in automobile insurance policies, a person
driving with the owner's consent is insured by the owner's policy, so there
is no' reason to impute the driver's primary negligence, since recovery for
damages due to the driver's negligence is insured.
16. Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674 (1934).
17. Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, .13 TEXAS L. REV. :161 (1935),.
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test so that the contributory negligence of one person cannot
be used to bar recovery by one who is himself free from fault.
A. L. Wright II

TORTS

-

LIABILITY OF CREDITOR FOR CONTACTING EMPLOYER
OF DEBTOR AS COLLECTION METHOD'

Plaintiff, a trusted bank employee, and associates contracted
with defendant printer to secure publication of a shoppers'
guide. Subsequently, the plaintiff's venture was incorporated
but the corporation soon failed. Defendant, a large depositor
of the employer-bank, wrote the bank's president that he had
been unable to collect a printing debt from plaintiff and would
appreciate assistance in securing payment. 2 Plaintiff explained
to his employer that the debt had been incurred during the existence of the corporation and that he was merely a stockholder
and not personally liable.8 When the employer communicated
this explanation to the defendant, he responded that plaintiff
had initiated the venture and had not disassociated himself
from personal responsibility. 4 The employer then notified
plaintiff that "he had heard enough of the matter and . . .
wanted it to be settled." 5 Thereupon, plaintiff's attorney wrote
defendant, warning him to cease his communication with plaintiff's employer. Defendant took this letter to the bank and
following a meeting of defendant with plaintiff and his employer, plaintiff was dismissed. Plaintiff brought suit for damages, and the trial court dismissed the action. On appeal, the
1. This Note is concerned with attempts to collect just or disputed debts.

There seems little question that an action would lie where a debt is falsely im-w
puted to a person. See note
. 2. The letter concluded,
and do so only because of
We will greatly appreciate

6 infra.
"We dislike having to bring this to your attention
the unsatisfactory response we get from Mr. Pack.
any assistance you may care to give us in securing

payment so that we will not have to proceed further against Mr. Pack." 155
So. 2d at 911.
3. See LA. R.S. 12:19B (1950): "A shareholder of a corporation . . . shall
not be personally liable for any debt or liability of the corporation."
* 4. There was evidence that defendant had been informed prior to incorporation by an associate of plaintiff that the associate would be personally liable for
the debt. 155 So. 2d at 910. After incorporation this associate informed defendant that he no longer would be personally liable. Defendant at least knew plain-

tiff's relationship to the venture had changed, but it does not-appear whether he
had been specifically informed plaintiff had disassociated himself from personal
responsibility for the enterprise. Id. at 911.
5. Id.

at 911.'

